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INTERPRETATION AND RE-INTERPRETATION OF A CLAUSE:
MAGNA CARTA AND THE WIDOW’S QUARANTINE
Janet Loengard*
Looking in pre-modern English legal records for examples of the widow’s quar-
antine and the writ de quarantina habenda1 that protected it is a little like looking
for the abominable snowman; many people swear it exists, although no one has seen
it for certain. But in the case of the elusive action, there are just enough sightings to
enable one to say positively that it was there. Over the centuries, quarantine did leave
a trail. This Paper follows it on two sides of an ocean, because quarantine provides
a rather good example of how a provision of Magna Carta was understood or inter-
preted by courts—and societies—with differing attitudes to land, heirs, and women.
The widow’s quarantine of course has nothing to do with disease; it was de-
signed for the protection of the woman who had just lost her husband and who faced
imminent eviction from her home by an unsympathetic heir or lord. The author of
the treatise called Britton described the situation with brutal reality: “[I]t is improper
that such wives should be thrust out of doors with their husbands’ bodies, without hav-
ing a place to lodge in . . . .”2 The remedy for that had its inception in Magna Carta
and, unlike the provisions in the same chapter guaranteeing dower and maritagium
and inheritance, here a new right is set out; the Charter of 1225 Chapter 7 reads:
[A]nd let her remain in the chief messuage of her said husband
for forty days after the death of her said husband, within which
[time] her dower shall be assigned to her, unless it shall have been
first assigned, or unless that house is a castle; and if she shall leave
the castle, immediately let there be provided for her a suitable
house in which she is able to live properly until her dower is as-
signed to her according to what has been said; and in the meantime
let her have her reasonable estovers of common [de communi].3
That is her right of quarantine. The penalty for its violation was set out in 1236,
in the first chapter of the Statute of Merton: a widow who could not have dower or
* Professor Emerita of history, Moravian College. I am grateful for comments on the Paper,
both at the session in which it was presented and later, especially those of Professor Charles
Donahue and Professor Elizabeth Papp Kamali.
1 Quarantine is spelled quarentina in the manuscript Registers of Writs and abridgements.
I have adopted the modern spelling throughout except within direct quotations.
2 2 BRITTON 246 (Francis Morgan Nichols ed. & trans., 1983).
3 MAGNA CARTA (1225) ch. 7, in J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 420, 422 (with introduction
by George Garnett & John Hudson, 3d ed. 2015).
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quarantine without plea and who succeeded in her suit was to have damages to the
value of her dower from the time of the husband’s death to the date she recovered
it.4 The language is obviously primarily concerned with dower and somewhat less
useful to the woman who just wanted to get back into a house.
The suit to achieve that was eventually the action brought by the writ de quarantina
habenda. It is not in the earliest Registers of Writs and in only one of those I have seen
from the earlier fourteenth century, but it appears in some, not all, in the fifteenth cen-
tury and it is in the printed Registers.5 Its wording recites the language of Magna
Carta although there is no mention of a substitute house and, significantly, the phrase
on estovers reads not “de communi” but “de bonis eorundem” of their goods, as if
to dispel any misunderstanding of “common.”6 It goes on to recite that immediately
after the husband’s death the defendant forcibly ejected the plaintiff woman from
the chief messuage which was not a castle, nor was her dower assigned, nor did he
allow her to take possession [percipere] of estovers, to her serious and not small
damage and against the tenor of the aforesaid charter. The sheriff to whom the writ
is addressed is ordered to call the parties before him, hear their accounts [rationibus]
there and then, and do the said widow full and swift justice according to the tenets
of the said charter.7
4 20 Hen. III, c. 1, in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM 1. But Cambridge University Library
[hereinafter CUL] MS Ee. 5. 22, fol. 53 explains that if she was holding in quarantine, the
widow would not recover damages until after the forty days—presumably meaning that she
could not sue for dower within that period—because the law did not require the heir to endow
her within the forty days if she was seised of her quarantine. The implication is that he could
safely wait until the fortieth day to assign dower. CUL MS Ee. 5 22, fol. 53, reprinted in 71
SELDEN SOCIETY, READINGS AND MOOTS AT THE INNS OF COURT IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY
xciii (Samuel E. Thorne ed., 1954).
5 The writ is not in British Library [hereinafter BL] Lansdowne MS 471/37 (1307–27),
BL Additional MS 38821 (c. 1289/90), BL Lansdowne MS 575/16 (14th C), BL Lansdowne
MS 564/5 (13th–14th C), BL Lansdowne MS 467/38 (14th C), BL Lansdowne MS 652/75
(14th C), BL Lansdowne MS 476/46 (14th C), BL Additional MS 25237 (14th C), Harvard
Law School [hereinafter HLS] MS 61 (1375–1425), HLS MS 24 (c.1275), or Middle Temple
MS 74 (undated). BL Harley MS 858 is listed as early fourteenth century and has two Registers.
The writ is not in the first but is in the second. However, in addition to the second Register the
volume sets out various statutes including the limitation of the county electorate to the 40-
shilling freeholder, 8 Henry VI, c.7 (1430), 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 243, so the volume may
have been supplemented over a period of time. De quarantina habenda appears in the four-
teenth-century manuscript HLS MS 166, dated at c. 1350. It is found in the fifteenth century
Registers in BL Stowe MS 409, BL Additional MS 19558, and BL Additional MS 25028 but
not in BL Stowe MS 410, or BL Additional MS 34901. Printed Registers have a marginal
note: Quod mulier habeat quarantinam suam et rationabile estoveriam suam de communi.
Magna Carta c. vii, Merton ca. 1 cum pena.
6 I.e., to rule out an interpretation that what was involved was the simple right to take
firewood for household use, common of estovers.
7 ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, LA NOUVELLE NATURA BREVIUM 161v–162 (London, 1581)
[hereinafter FNB].
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The statute seems quite clear, but the implementation of it was not. The wording
of the writ is open to interpretation: What conditions had to be met before a woman
could claim quarantine? What might she do to lose it? What is a chief messuage?
What is a castle? What is a house in which the widow can live decently?8 What does
estovers cover? Some of the questions had definite answers. First, since quarantine
is based on dower, the basic requirements for dower had to be met: a woman had to
have been lawfully married to the deceased and he, in turn, had to have been seised
of property with which to endow her.9 But unlike dower, since the reference is to his
chief messuage, only property of which a husband was seised at the time of his death
would be eligible for quarantine. In an adaptation of Merton’s decree awarding
damages, the rule in quarantine was held to be that a successful widow plaintiff was
put in place for as many of the forty days as were left and received damages for the
days during which she was ousted.10 If the forty days were over, she could still sue for
damages for the days during which she was ejected.11 Those are the easy questions.
Others, less clear, could be settled only by litigation. And there is almost no recorded
litigation. I have never seen an action commenced by the writ de quarantina habenda.
There is not quite a handful of cases involving or even mentioning quarantine: one in
the Year Books; one, and two fragments, in the nominate reports; and only one I know
of in the plea rolls I have examined.
There are various possible reasons for the silence. One of course might be that
the whole idea of quarantine was from the start not accepted and was quietly
ignored. That is unlikely, since those few cases do exist and masses of fifteenth- and
sixteenth-century commentary assume quarantine’s existence. Nor have I seen any
objection to the principle involved; the Fine Rolls of Henry III show that even the
king granted manors to widows to live in until their dower was assigned, although
8 The Latin word is honeste, decently. One sixteenth-century text explains that the word
refers to the house, not the woman because “it is immaterial if she keeps bawdery.” Gray’s
Inn MS 25, fols. 27–28, in 132 SELDEN SOCIETY, SELECTED READINGS AND COMMENTARIES
ON MAGNA CARTA 65, 70 (John Baker ed., 2015) [hereinafter SELECTED READINGS].
9 Id. at 68.
10 Id. at 68–70.
11 See the “ordinary gloss,” CUL MS Hh. 2.6, fol. 9, collated with University College
Oxford MS 163, unfoliated; Bodleian Library MS Rawlinson C.294, fols. 3–4; CUL MS Ee.
5.22, fols. 26v–28; CUL MS Ii. 5.43, fols. 29–30v, fol. 10 [hereinafter CUL MS Hh. 2.6],
tr. The Fifteenth Century ‘Ordinary Gloss’, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 21, 24;
see also Northwestern University Law School Newcastle MS, fols. 10v– 11v, 10v, tr.
Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1455/60, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 30, 30–31; HLS
MS 13, at 395–402, 396, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1491/1508, in SELECTED READINGS,
supra note 8, at 44, 45–46; BL MS Hargrave 87, fols. 208v–215v, 209, collated with HLS
MS 88, fols. 8v–13 [hereinafter BL MS Hargrave 87], tr. Humphrey Hervy, Inner Temple,
c. 1480/1500, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 49, 50; Gray’s Inn MS 25, fols. 27–
28, tr. From the Chaloner Manuscript, Gray’s Inn, c. 1520, in SELECTED READINGS, supra
note 8, at 65, 66. I am grateful to Professor Baker for permitting me to see the text before the
volume was issued.
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without reference to Magna Carta.12 A second reason could be that almost no women
ever brought the action. This may be the opinion of Sir John Baker; in the introduc-
tion to his edition of Selected Readings and Commentaries on Magna Carta, he
noted finding numerous comments on quarantine, adding that it was “a subject less
visible in the year books because the legal remedy was impractical and rarely if ever
used.”13 A third reason, based on the non-appearance of de quarantina habenda in
so many early Registers, might be that at least until the middle of the fourteenth
century the writ, and therefore the action, was not widely known if they were known
at all. Moreover, at roughly that time dower began to be replaced by the jointure, the
estate set aside by the bridegroom’s family for the support of the bride should she
become a widow; when a woman had a jointure, there was of course no need for
dower and with certain exceptions she could not claim both.14 But there is another,
simpler explanation for the silence. The writ is viscontiel and it was apparently non-
returnable. Such writs stayed with the sheriff, who might need them if he was called
to explain his handling of a matter. What he, or his heirs, did with them was their
concern. Moreover, he acted alone; in the Nouvelle Natura Brevium, Anthony
Fitzherbert explained that the sheriff was not to wait until the county court was
held—which might be a matter of weeks—because the writ was a commission to
him.15 Rather, he was to immediately make process against the defendant, within
two or three days, and thereupon to proceed as justices do in a commission of oyer
12 E.g., “[o]rder to the sheriff of Yorkshire to permit Margaret [widow] of Gilbert of
Ayton, to stay in the houses [sic] of the same Gilbert until her dower is assigned from the
same land either by the king or by another who will have custody of his land [;]” note that
“[t]he king has granted the manor of Iver with appurtenances to Ada, [widow] of John son
of Robert, until a certain dower has been assigned to her from the lands formerly of the same
John.” 3 CALENDAR OF FINE ROLLS OF THE REIGN OF HENRY III 36, 390 (Paul Dryburgh &
Beth Hartland eds., 2009). Several later writers declared that the king was not bound to give
quarantine and there could be no suit for it against him. HLS MS 13, at 395; BL MS Hargrave
87 fol. 209v, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 45, 50.
13 SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at lxix. One manuscript suggests trespass as an
alternative action: “The law is the same of the dower or inheritance, that she shall hold on
in the chief house, if it is not a castle, and have her quarantine . . . . And if the heir ousts her she
shall have an action of trespass against the heir,” Library of Congress [hereinafter LC] MS 139,
at 3–8, 3 collated with a second version, id. at 209–14, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8,
at 33, 34. Trespass, brought in the central courts and resulting in an award of damages, would
be useful only after the forty days were over, as in the case of Matilda de Kelkfeld, infra note 17.
14 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535–36), 3 STATUTES OF THE REALM 540–41.
15 FNB, supra note 7, at 161. So far as I know, only seven counties have any county court
material extant and much of it is fragmentary. I have found no evidence of de quarantina
habenda in those I have seen. For discussion of the courts see ROBERT C. PALMER, THE COUNTY
COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1982). Professor Palmer has confirmed in conversation
that he has not seen a suit for quarantine in county court records. There is no relevant material
in The National Archives [hereinafter TNA] C255/5/1, a unique file which includes existing
writs to sheriffs and bailiffs ordering justice to be done, 1265–1307. Many refer to matters
heard without writ in county court but there is a variety of cases: debt, nuisance, and others.
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and terminer.16 In other words, the only time quarantine would appear in the existing
records would be if litigation concerning or based on it went to another court.
Those cases and fragments did appear. The first is a King’s Bench case from
Michaelmas Term 1290.17 Matilda de Kelkfeld, widow of Henry, claimed that despite
the provisions in Magna Carta, which she spelled out in full, one Steven le Tygler
and five or six other men (the number varies in subsequent entries) had violently,
vi et armis, ejected her from her late husband’s chief messuage within forty days of
his death, although no dower had been assigned.18 Moreover, they had taken and
carried away her animals and other goods and chattels found there, whereby she had
suffered damages of a hundred shillings.19 She did not, and could not, sue to be put
back into the messuage because the forty days would have been long over and in any
event she could not at any time have brought an action for quarantine in King’s
Bench.20 Matilda sued in trespass.21 It is not clear whether her estimate of damages
was based solely on the loss of goods rather than on her ouster, or whether both
were included in the computation.22 There is no demand for dower—that would have
required a different writ—and no statement as to whether her dower was ever
assigned. But the plea roll record recites the exact Magna Carta language on quaran-
tine as the justification for her occupation of the chief messuage.23 Steven le Tygler
denied force and arms, and explained that the late Henry had left an underage son
and that his overlord had put Steven into custody of both the heir and his land.24
Matilda quite properly simply reiterated her statement because Steven, like the heir,
would have taken subject to her right.25 It is unknown if she was successful; both
parties asked for a jury but after multiple adjournments over four terms the matter
disappears from the records.26 It is unreported elsewhere. But, significantly, the
gravamen of her claim was not challenged; Magna Carta had conferred a right, she
fell within its protection, and the suit was based on its violation.
16 FNB, supra note 7, at 162.
17 TNA KB27/125 fol. 18. All plea rolls cited have been viewed on the online database
Anglo-American Legal Tradition, maintained by Professor Robert C. Palmer at the O’Quinn
Law Library of The University of Houston Law Center, at http://aalt.law.uh.edu [http://perma
.cc/C64Z-M3VR]; fol. 18 is IMG 7837. I was alerted to Matilda de Kelkfeld by Dr. Paul Brand’s
mentioning in his 2015 Selden Society lecture on Magna Carta that there was a case in 1290
concerning quarantine.
18 TNA KB27/125 fol. 18.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See LC MS 139, at 3, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1460, in SELECTED READINGS,
supra note 8, at 33, 34.
23 TNA KB27/125 fol. 18.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 TNA KB27/126 fol. 14, KB27/127 fol. 182v, KB27/129 fol. 6; KB27/130 fol. 8v.
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The best-known case dates from exactly a hundred and fifty years later,
Michaelmas Term 19 Henry VI,27 and it demonstrates an exceptionally narrow judi-
cial interpretation of the apparently straightforward language of the statute, reflecting
how changing views of legal rights affected a particular provision. Courts generally
looked with some favor on dower—widows won a large proportion of their suits—
but apparently the same benevolent attitude did not extend to quarantine. There is
no suggestion in this case that the judges were following precedent, no comment
referring to earlier decisions; from the wording of the report, their decision rested
on their own independent conclusions.28 The case turns on the meaning, in the
context of Magna Carta Chapter 7, of the word estovers. It is true that Magna Carta
granted the widow estovers de communi, of common, and the writ de quarantina
habenda speaks of estovers de bonis eorundem, of their goods.29 But by the fifteenth
century, the doctrine that married women had and could have no personal property
had taken hold. There could be no common goods; all goods were the husband’s.30
The holding relies on that premise. This was a suit brought in Common Pleas by a
writ of debt against an unnamed widow as executrix of her husband.31 Her attorney
was none other than Serjeant John Fortescue, who pleaded that she was the wife and
executrix of deceased, remained in his house after his death, and ate and drank of
his goods until she was endowed.32 Richard Newton, the chief justice, interrupted:
the widow could not administer an estate by consuming it.33 A husband was not
bound to find a living for his wife after his death.34 Moreover, it was added by the
clerk of Common Pleas, Magna Carta says a woman shall have reasonable estovers,
not that she should have her living from them; Justice Fulthorp chimed in to illus-
trate that by saying that she could not slay an ox and live on it.35 The case is reported
27 It is expressly cited as authority in CUL MS Ee. 6. 1, fol. 3; BL MS Hargrave 87, fol.
209; and BL MS Additional 25232, fols. 27–31, fol. 29v (where it appears to be referred to
as a statute). For the above and their translations, see SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at
27, 27; Humphrey Hervy, Inner Temple, c. 1480/1500, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note
8, at 49, 50; SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 83, 88.
28 Year Book [hereinafter YB] Mich. 19 Hen. VI, fols. 14v–15r, pl. 34.
29 See Gray’s Inn MS 25, fols. 27–28, tr. From the Chaloner Manuscript, Gray’s Inn, c.
1520, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 65, 66.
30 For a later statement of the rule, see id.: “Of common: namely of those things which
were her husband’s.” The manuscript is dated at c. 1520 by Professor Baker. Id.
31 YB Mich. 19 Hen. VI, fols. 14v–15r, pl. 34.
32 Id. She also claimed that she had paid the expenses of her husband’s funeral, pre-
sumably as partial explanation for the diminished amount left to the heir. Id. Bracton speaks
to both points: “Expenses in connexion with the funeral ought also to be deducted beforehand.
Also the necessary expenses of the wife throughout her quarantine, unless her dower is
earlier assigned her.” 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 180 (George E.
Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., with notes, 1968) [hereinafter BRACTON].
33 YB Mich. 19 Hen. VI, fols. 14v–15r, pl. 34.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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in Statham’s Abridgement and Fitzherbert’s Abridgement as meaning that a widow
could use stuff—Statham’s word—that was in the house, such as pots, pans, beef,
and bacon, but no more.36 Commentators not only accepted but embroidered on the
decision; one wrote gleefully that “she shall not have food . . . or drink from her
husband’s goods, but only such things as are . . . not wastable,”37 while another
forbade the use of food or drink found in the house and the slaying of beasts as a
wrong to the executors.38 To be sure, other writers were more moderate. One, in the
fifteenth century, would grant “housebote and haybote and all other forms of suste-
nance, such as slain oxen and sheep”—livestock was still off limits.39 More specifi-
cally but along the same lines, another would allow “reasonable sustenance from the
movable things which were her husband’s at the time of his dying, such as beef,
bacon, pots, pans and such like. . . . But she may not slaughter oxen or sheep to eat,”
again citing Newton’s comments in the Year Book entry.40 But when Anthony
Fitzherbert duly reported the case in his Abridgement, he added, “But suppose that
the husband had nothing [in the house] of which she was able to live, then it seems
she is able to kill [things].”41 Even in the more generous interpretations, the basic
premise of the husband’s ownership was not denied; the question was the effect on
it of Magna Carta and de quarantina habenda—and, in Fitzherbert’s view, necessity.
Edward Coke dissented.42 In his comments on Magna Carta in the Second
Institutes, he identified “reasonable estovers” as sustenance and objected in a note
36 NICHOLAS STATHAM, ABRIDGEMENT OF CASES TO THE END OF HENRY VI (1490) [here-
inafter STATHAM’S ABRIDGEMENT], originally unfoliated but shown as fol. 150r in the digi-
tized form, HLS RARE, STC 23238, BEALE R55, online at http://amesfoundation.law.harvard
.edu/digital/Statham/StathamMetadata.html [https://perma.cc/6W9G-K3H2] (follow “Quare
non admisit 1–2, Quarentine 1, Quare ejecit infra terminum 1–3” link); see also ANTHONY
FITZHERBERT, LA GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT fol. 136v (London, 1577) [hereinafter FITZ-
HERBERT’S ABRIDGEMENT] (the marginal note is M.19 H.6.14).
37 CUL MS Hh. 2.6, fol. 9, 10, tr. The Fifteenth-Century ‘Ordinary Gloss,’ in SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 8, at 21, 24.
38 See a commentary from around 1570, BL MS Additional 25232, fols. 27–31, tr. Probably
c. 1570, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 83, 87–88:
But she may not have food or drink which is found in the house, and
she may not slay the beasts or sheep which were her husband’s, for that
is a wrong to the executors. . . . [S]he may take the use and occupation
of the utensils and estovers for her fuel, without destruction, by the
words of the statute.
Id. (citing YB Mich. 19 Hen. VI, fol. 14, pl. 34).
39 HLS MS 13, at 17–18, tr. Fifteenth Century, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at
42, 44.
40 BL MS Hargrave 87, fol. 209, tr. Humphrey Hervy, Inner Temple, c. 1480/1500, in
SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 49, 50 (citing YB Mich. 18 Hen. VI). He did grant the
widow grain to make bread and ale. Id.
41 “semble si fuit tuer.” FITZHERBERT’S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 36, at 136v.
42 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 17
(London, 1669). There is a marginal note to both YB M. 19 H. 6.14 and Register 175.
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that some say “the Widow [can’t] kill . . . the [Oxen] of [her] Husband[ ] . . . [b]ut
the Register [says] Quod interim habeant rationabilia Estoveria de bonis eorundum
maritorum, which [seems to expound] this Branch.”43 The addition of the word
“maritorum,” actually not found in the writ, is at first sight puzzling, but Coke was
essentially following his sources: Bracton speaks only of goods de communi,44 but
Britton says the widow shall have proper sustenance (covenable susteinaunce) out
of the issue of all the lands (del issue del entier des terres)45 and Fleta speaks in
terms of decent necessaries (necessaria honeste) to be found out of the common
inheritance (de hereditate communi).46
A third case, also in Common Pleas, dates from another hundred-plus years
later, in 1552, and takes up yet another issue. Kettillesby v. Kettillesby was a suit for
dower and Dyer’s report of it47 says that in reply the defendant pleaded that after the
latest continuance of her suit, the widow had illegally entered one of the manors of
her husband, which caused her writ to abate.48 In response, the widow argued for
quarantine although she is not reported as using the term: she explained that after the
death of her husband the heir had entered the manor and he and the widow had lived
together on it at the will of the heir and she claimed only at his will.49 That was held
no plea, since for quarantine one had to show the certain death of the husband and
the time of the forty days, and on the court’s advice the plaintiff traversed the entry.50
More significantly, the case substantiates the proposition found in the readings that
a widow could not leave her husband’s property and return to claim her quarantine
in it—presumably since Mrs. Kettillesby is said to have entered the manor she must
have first left it. It is another example of interpretation putting obstacles in the path
to a successful claim, although here the interpretation is not new; the question had been
disputed in the Inns of Court before the Kettillesbys ever came into Common Pleas.51
43 Id.
44 BRACTON, supra note 32, at 276. Professor Thorne has translated de communi as “of
the common inheritance.”
45 BRITTON, supra note 2, at 247.
46 4 FLETA bk. 5 c. 23, at 77, in 99 SELDEN SOCIETY (G. O. Sayles ed. & trans., 1983).
47 LES REPORTS . . . DE LEY COLLECT & REPORT PER TRES-REVEREND JUDGE SIR JACQUES
DYER 76v (London, 1688) [hereinafter DYER].
48 Id.
49 Id. Thomas Carus in his Lecture VIII (Middle Temple, Lent Term 1556) wrote that if
a husband had several houses, the wife should have quarantine in the house he lived in at the
time of his death “and she shall occupy this in common with the heir.” HLS MS 5054, fols.
80–98v, 92v, tr. Thomas Carus, Middle Temple, Lent 1556, in SELECTED READINGS, supra
note 8, at 71, 75; see also CUL MS Hh.2.6, fol. 9, tr. The Fifteenth-Century ‘Ordinary Glass,’
in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 21, 22, which speaks of the heir allowing the widow
to be “in his house with him, of his free will.”
50 DYER, supra note 47.
51 In his Lecture VIII Humphrey Hervy wrote, “In his view a woman may have her
quarantine by way of entry, for the statute says and shall remain in the capital messuage.”
BL MS Hargrave 87, fol. 209v, tr. Humphrey Hervy, Inner Temple, c. 1480/1500, in SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 8, at 49, 50.
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There are two, possibly three, other sightings of litigation over quarantine. Dyer
notes casually—following a case on a totally different matter—that “another matter
was moved, whether a woman living in her husband’s house for her quarantine could
defend the possession of it with force etc.”52 But there is nothing further. A 1677 edition
of the New Natura Brevium has a marginal note to the writ de quarantina habenda:
“Quaere if an Infant may keep the [possession] during the time of Quar[a]ntine by force
of the statute of 8 H[enry] 6 [c.] 4 & 5 Ma[ry],” with a citation to Dyer’s comment.53
The statute of 8 Henry VI c. 4 actually deals with the Staple, but 8 Henry VI c. 9
recites and confirms the Ricardian statute of forcible entries.54 Finally, quarantine
is noted to prove an unrelated point in the 1612 Case of the Commendams, which
of course has nothing to do with women or dower or de quarantina habenda. It was
argued that the proposed commendation was temporary, but a commendation ought
to be permanent, as vinculum conjugale between the rector and his benefice: one
may give dower without a deed but for no less than life and a jointure cannot be made
for the life of another.55 Then the report reads, “Dyer 76[ ] in case of Quar[a]ntine
the [w]ife must not depart from the [h]ouse upon her [h]usband’s [d]eath, and return
when she will for the rest of her [d]ays.”56 Again, there is no further comment.
Yet there are those pages and pages of commentary, moots, and readings on
quarantine, all under the rubric of Magna Carta Chapter 7. Some offer citation to
Year Book cases, Fitzherbert’s Abridgement, or treatises such as Perkins Profitable
Book.57 But in none of the cases is quarantine the issue and in fact none of the cases
mentions quarantine; they uniformly concern dower. The readers and lecturers have
extrapolated their conclusions from the results there. Other texts do not cite any
authority. Either they are based on unknown sources or much of what was written
is legal fantasy or an exercise in logic, not unlike the speculation of medieval theo-
logians. They are, yet again, elaborate embroideries on the single, apparently defini-
tive, sentence in Magna Carta Chapter 7. What is notable is a tendency to contain
quarantine within narrow bounds. Some of the comments are based on the language
of the Charter; all the writers agreed that unless a widow was dowable she could not
have quarantine, since the Charter says “until her dower is assigned.” The property
in which she was to remain had to be one of which she could be endowed; obviously
land in which a husband had held only a life estate was not eligible.58 It was not a
52 DYER, supra note 47, at 161. The entry is Easter Term 4 & 5 Phillip and Mary (1558).
53 THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM OF THE MOST REVEREND JUDGE MR. ANTHONY
FITZHERBERT 361 (London, 1677) (citing DYER, supra note 47, at 161). This is an English
translation of FNB, supra note 7.
54 5 Ric. II., c. 7, 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 20 (1381).
55 John Colt and Glover Against the Bishop of Coventry and Lichfield, in THE REPORTS OF
THAT REVEREND AND LEARNED JUDGE . . . SIR HENRY HOBART 140, 153 (5th ed. London, 1724).
56 Id.
57 A PROFITABLE BOOKE OF MASTER JOHN PERKINS (London, 1586).
58 BRITTON, supra note 2, at 242–43; COKE, supra note 42, at 17.
412 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 25:403
stretch to read Chapter 7 “unless it shall have been first assigned” as referring to
dower assigned at the church door or ex assensu patris, so that a woman so endowed
could not claim quarantine.59 (It was, however, a concession—one apparently gener-
ally accepted—to allow her to refuse the assignment and take the common law
dower, which entitled her to her forty days). Logic supported the general opinion
that if a woman remarried within the forty days she lost her quarantine; as Coke put
it, “[Widow etc. . . .] Therefore if she marry within the forty dayes, she lose[s] her
Quarentine, for [h]er Widowhood is past, and she ha[s] provided for her self, and her
Quarentine is appropriate[d] to her Widows estate.”60 The explanation of one
commentator that the reason for the loss was that “the two of them would spend
more estovers than she alone” is less convincing.61 It was generally said that if a
woman sued for a reasonable part of her husband’s goods she lost her quarantine.62
But beyond the agreement on those principles, there were as many questions—
and as many opinions—as enthusiastic lawyers could devise. Chapter 7 dictates that
the widow shall remain in the chief messuage if it is not a castle.63 What is a castle?
59 9 Hen. III, c. 7; BRITTON, supra note 2, at 236.
60 COKE, supra note 42, at 17.
61 Gray’s Inn, MS 25, fol. 27v, tr. From the Chaloner Manuscript, Gray’s Inn, c. 1520,
in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 65, 69. The text of a lecture by Humphrey Hervy reads:
“The law [which would grant the widow quarantine] is the same if she marries again before
she brings her writ de quarantina habenda.” BL MS Hargrave 87 fol. 209, tr. Humphrey Hervy,
Inner Temple, c. 1480/1500, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 49, 50. But he does not
specify the timing of the suit.
62 However, the divergent rules which governed descent of land and disposal of a de-
ceased’s personal property made it reasonable to declare that a writ de quarantina habenda
could be made out against either the heir or the executors, depending on whether a woman
was kept out of the house or denied use of chattels. “This writ may be made out . . . one
against the heir and another against executors. Against the heir . . . where the heir keeps her
out of the chief house . . . . If, however, she cannot have her quarantine from her husband’s
chattels, then . . . against the executors, because they have her husband’s goods.” CUL MS
Hh. 2.6, fol.10, tr. The Fifteenth-Century ‘Ordinary Gloss,’ in SELECTED READINGS, supra
note 8, at 21, 24. “[F]or the woman shall have no part of any estovers from the heir, in-
asmuch as he has no estovers . . . and it is the executors who have the stock and stuff . . . .
Thus the woman shall have her reasonable estovers through the executors.” LC MS 139, at
3, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1460, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 33, 34. There
was some uncertainty about whether there were two distinct writs, but as William Fletewood
observed, “But in the Register and in Master Fitzherbert [FNB] I find but one writ . . . .”
Extracts from a Treatise on Magna Carta Probably by William Fletewood (c. 1558), in
SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 366, 370 [hereinafter Fletewood]. He thought it lay
against the heir and included quarantine in both house and chattels, rather than being directed
to the executors for the latter, but unless the heir was the executor that would present a problem
given the division between descent of real property and division of personalty. “Extracts from
a Treatise on Magna Carta, Probably by William Fletewood” (c.1558), CUL MS. Gg. 6.18,
fols. 3–4lv, 14, tr. Fletewood, supra, at 366, 370.
63 Despite the seemingly definitive wording of Chapter 7, either there was some question
on the point or else commentators could not resist playing with it. Two manuscripts headed
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Is it any defensible house, or perhaps only one built before the limit of legal memory
or, if later, by license?64 Coke, in his commentary on Magna Carta, was quite certain:
“This is intended of a [c]astle, that is Warlike, and maintained for the necessary
defence of the Realm, and not for a Castle in name maintained for habitation of the
owner.”65 What if the husband’s only holding was a castle? In what would appear
to be direct contravention of Magna Carta, one fifteenth-century text reads: “If, how-
ever, the husband dies seised of a castle only, I conceive that in this case the heir
shall not be bound to find the wife her quarantine.”66 It was a minority opinion. The
author of a text probably from Lincoln’s Inn in the 1450s wrote confidently but
confusingly, “Unless the house is a castle etc. This shall be understood of a castle
where her husband had no other tenements, quia necessitas non habet legem . . . .”67
Thomas Carus’s Lecture 8 in Lent, 1556, included the proposition that “If the
husband had no house except a castle, a part of the castle shall be assigned to the
wife for her quarantine . . . .”68 William Fletewood found himself in a quandary
when he wrote his later sixteenth-century treatise, but came to the same conclusion:
it was not desirable for women to have castles because,
[W]omen are so naturally weak . . . that, not only can they not
defend them, they would also be an impediment to the others
who must defend them; for the Amazons are all now dead. It is
Incipiunt quaestiones compilate primo de Magna Carta et aliis statutis, CUL MS. Ll. 4. 17,
fols. 219–20, collated with CUL MS Hh. 2.8, fols. 115–120V, do not mention quarantine by
name. But it is clearly the subject of “Question 5[:] May a widow claim to stay in the capital
mansion if it is a castle? For the statute says, ‘and if she has left the castle,’ which assumes
she leaves willingly. . . . It is said that she may not.” Professors Thorne and Baker date the
manuscript to the first two decades of Edward III. SELDEN SOCIETY, 105 READINGS AND
MOOTS AT THE INNS OF COURT IN THE FIFTEENTH CENTURY cxlv (Samuel E. Thorne and J.
H. Baker eds., London, 1990). The four questions there on Chapter 7 are also printed in From
the ‘Quaestiones compilate de Magna Carta et aliis Statutis,’ c. 1340/45, in SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 8, at 20, 20–21. A later manuscript, dated 1455/60, uses the same word-
ing in a discussion of dower. Northwestern University Newcastle MS fol. 11, tr. Probably
Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1455/60, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 30, 32.
64 Gray’s Inn MS 25, fol. 28; From the Chaloner Manuscript, Gray’s Inn, c. 1520, in
SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 65, 69. Both Fleta and Britton expand the holdings
in which a woman should not have quarantine to include a head [place] of a county or
barony. FLETA, supra note 46, at 77–79; BRITTON, supra note 2, at 246.
65 COKE, supra note 42, at 17.
66 HLS MS 13, at 18, tr. Fifteenth Century, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at
42, 44.
67 Northwestern University Newcastle MS fol. 10v, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c.
1455/60, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 30, 31.
68 HLS MS 5054, fol. 92v, tr. Thomas Carus, Middle Temple, Lent 1556, in SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 8, at 71, 76. The comment is followed by the more unorthodox “for
she may be endowed with part of a castle as well as of a house, if she wishes.” Id.
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also dangerous for women to be there, lest perhaps they should
be enticed by the enemy into betrayal.69
There is an example taken from Livy. On the other hand if the husband had no other
house “then it is said that she may remain . . . for the statute [Magna Carta] does not
provide that she should be without a suitable abode, and necessity is without law.”70
What if all the late husband’s holdings are castles? Here a mid-fifteenth century text
looks beyond quarantine to a more permanent occupation by the widow and sug-
gests a note of reality: “[I]t is used nowadays that . . . the wife shall have one of
them as a benefit of dower,” a clear extrapolation from what the writer sees as current
dower practice.71 Of course, if the husband had neither house nor castle, the heir had
no obligation to provide housing for “[t]he statute says . . . remain in [her hus-
band’s] capital messuage.”72
Could the widow choose the alternative house to be provided for her if the chief
messuage was a castle and there were other houses? Does “chief messuage” mean
the house the husband was in on the day of his death? “This shall be understood to
mean the same house where her husband was on the day of his dying . . . .”73 Then
what if a husband dies in the house of a stranger, not in one of which he is seised?
Humphrey Hervy thought that if a husband had several houses but lived in none of
them and died in a stranger’s house, the widow not only got quarantine but got to
choose the house she would live in.74 Sometimes there is an acknowledgement of
unreality: What if a husband has two houses and lives in each for six months of the
year? Which is chief or may a widow choose one? William Fletewood considered
the problem at length:
But if there are various houses and the husband lived sometimes
in one and sometimes in another, the choice is given to the woman.
Some, however, do not agree with this, for the statute says shall
be assigned to her and he who has the assignment ought to have
the choice, and if the wife should have the choice she might
69 CUL MS Gg. 6. 18, fol. 13v, tr. Fletewood, supra note 62, at 370.
70 Id.
71 Northwestern University MS fol. 10v, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1455/60, in
SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 30, 31.
72 HLS MS 13, at 395, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1491/1508, in SELECTED READINGS,
supra note 8, at 44, 45.
73 Northwestern University Newcastle MS fol. 10v, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1455/60,
in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 30, 30; see also Thomas Carus, HLS MS 5054 fol.
92v, tr. Thomas Carus, Middle Temple, Lent 1556, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 71,
75. Carus would not give the widow choice if her husband had held several houses. See id.
74 BL MS Hargrave 87 fol. 209, tr. Humphrey Hervy, Inner Temple, c. 1480/1500, in
SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 49, 49.
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perhaps take the better, whereas the statute says . . . a suitable
house shall be provided for her. But these are only fancies.75
What if the widow leases the premises to someone else—presumably on a very
short-term lease—may the lessee be ejected? Yes, because the privilege is personal
to the woman.76 It is an endless parade of learning but there is no way to know how
much of it, or any of it, has a basis in practice.
Defenses against dower claims were necessarily defenses against quarantine: It
was a good plea to show that a woman had not been joined in lawful matrimony to
the deceased, or that he was still alive,77 or that he had been attainted or outlawed,78
or that the woman had eloped from her husband and lived in adultery until her
husband died, or that she had withheld charters from the heir or—in the case of a
minor—withheld the heir himself from his guardian.79 But there were situations
where quarantine might be barred even though dower was not, the most important
being that the husband had not been seised at the time of his death. Others were that
the woman had inherited a house of her own,80 that the husband had held no house,
although he might have held land,81 or that there had been a spontaneous abandon-
ment of the quarantine premises.82 Still others were more esoteric. In Thomas Carus’s
75 “Extracts from a Treatise on Magna Carta,” fol. 13v, tr. Fletewood, supra note 62, at
366, 369. The fifteenth-century HLS MS 13, at 17 comes to the same conclusion: the wife
may choose. Fifteenth-Century, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 42, 43.
76 Northwestern University Newcastle MS fol. 11v, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1455/60,
in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 30, 32.
77 “[H]e must be dead in fact and not civilly dead, for if he enters into religion before having
carnal knowledge she shall not have dower . . . .” Gray’s Inn MS 25, fol. 27v, tr. From the
Chaloner Manuscript, Gray’s Inn, c. 1520, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 65, 68.
“If the husband enters into religion, his wife shall never have quarantina habenda . . . .” BL
MS Additional 25232, fol. 30, tr. Probably c. 1570, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at
83, 88. The statement is based on a case of 32 Edward I in which a widow was denied dower;
there is no mention of quarantine. 31 CHRONICLES AND MEMORIALS OF GREAT BRITAIN AND
IRELAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES [Rolls Series] 166 (Alfred J. Harwood ed., London,
1864); see FITZHERBERT’S ABRIDGEMENT, supra note 36, at pl. 136.
78 The statute of 1 Edward VI, c. 12 (1547) provided that the wife of a person attainted,
convicted, or outlawed for trespass, petty treason, misprision of treason, murder, or any other
felony was to be able to demand, have, and enjoy her dower, any statute, usage, or custom
to the contrary notwithstanding. 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM (1547).
79 “Generally in all cases where the heir may discharge dower, he may discharge the
quarantine for the same causes . . . .” HLS MS 13, at 396, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c.
1491/1508, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 44, 46.
80 BL MS Additional 25232, fol. 29v, tr. Probably c. 1570, in SELECTED READINGS,
supra note 8, at 83, 88. I have not seen this mentioned elsewhere.
81 HLS MS 13, at 395, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1491/1508, in SELECTED READINGS,
supra note 8, at 44, 45; Gray’s Inn MS 25, fol. 27v, tr. From the Chaloner Manuscript, Gray’s
Inn, c. 1520, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 65, 69.
82 BL MS Additional 25232, fol. 29v, tr. Probably c. 1570, in SELECTED READINGS, supra
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Middle Temple lecture devoted to where a woman could have her quarantine and
where not, twelve of his thirty-two examples denied it.83 The lecture makes good
reading, but it is difficult to see it as a serious exposition of law as it was practiced.
Were there many instances where three women claimed quarantine in the same
house at the same time?84 Did many situations arise where a man married outside the
realm, abandoned his wife, returned to England, married again and died? Or where
a man married a woman who immediately became a nun, married again, and died?85
One cannot help but wonder the reaction of the young men sitting in the Middle
Temple listening to him.
Before the end of the fifteenth century, then, whatever its practical application,
quarantine had taken on a theoretical life of its own, removed from and even antitheti-
cal to its origin in 1225. I have not seen a text invoking “The Great Charter of the
Liberties of England” when Chapter 7 was the topic under discussion; the Charter
is consistently referred to as “the statute” and texts sometimes betray a hazy under-
standing of its background, as in the remark that “This statute, [Chapter 7], and all
these statutes in Magna Carta, are in affirmation of the common law.”86 Or, on the
subject of widows’ not being constrained to marry, “Master Stamford says that this
statute of Prerogativa Regis doth but confirm the common law which was before,
as appears (he says) by Magna Carta, Chapter 7, which was (he says) made in the
time of Henry III.”87
It is not an impressive record for an action. But a brighter future lay ahead.
British law came to the North American colonies. That meant Magna Carta came to
the North American colonies, and quarantine came with it. After the Revolution,
quarantine was accepted in a number of states, and in many of them ratified by
statute.88 Those statutes varied in how closely they adhered to the Charter’s Chapter
7, although all quoted or paraphrased it. In New York, a law of 1787 reads in part
note 8, at 83, 87. This is a statement of the rule that once a widow left the chief messuage she
could not re-enter and claim quarantine in it. See Kettillesby & Kettillesby, in DYER, supra
note 47, at 77.
83 HLS MS 5054, fol. 92v, tr. Thomas Carus, Middle Temple, Lent 1556, in SELECTED
READINGS, supra note 8, at 71, 75–77.
84 As if a grandfather, father, and son died in rapid succession, each being seised in turn
of the same house and each leaving a wife. HLS MS 13, at 17, tr. Fifteenth-Century, in
SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 42, 43. Three women might claim quarantine in the
same house if their late husbands had been tenants in common. HLS MS 5054, fol. 93, tr.
Thomas Carus, Middle Temple, Lent 1556, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 71, 77.
85 Both situations were proposed. HLS MS 5054, fol. 93, tr. Thomas Carus, Middle
Temple, Lent 1556, in SELECTED READINGS, supra note 8, at 71, 76.
86 LC MS 139, at 3, tr. Probably Lincoln’s Inn, c. 1460, in SELECTED READINGS, supra
note 8, at 33, 33.
87 BL MS Additional 25352, fol. 30v, tr. Probably c. 1570, in SELECTED READINGS,
supra note 8, at 83, 89.
88 See generally P. H. Vartanian, Widow’s Right of Quarantine, 126 A.L.R. 796 (1940).
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“and she shall tarry in the chief house of her husband forty days after the death of
her husband or until her dower be assigned to her . . . .”89 The next section of the
chapter quotes the Statute of Merton Chapter 1 without identifying it: a widow who
was deforced of her dower or quarantine and successfully sued for it was entitled to
damages from the date of her husband’s death.90 The wording “forty days after the
death of her husband, or until her dower be assigned”91 permits an interpretation that
only assignment of dower cut short the quarantine, but in 1810 the Supreme Court
of New York rejected that view.92 In Jackson ex dem. Clark v. O’Donaghy,93 it held
that the forty-day period was absolute so that the heir could eject the widow once
it had passed.94
There is some difference between the words of our statute . . .
and magna charta, (c.7.) from which our statute was taken; but
it is a difference, I apprehend, in the words only . . . .
. . . .
[If the legislature had intended otherwise] then the limitation . . .
to forty days would be useless. The construction, therefore, of
our statute and magna charta must be the same . . . .95
The forty-day limit was never disavowed but was, rather, explicitly reinforced and
at the same time divorced from assignment of dower. In 1929, New York abolished
dower for all marriages after September 1, 1930;96 the statute applicable to marriages
before that date provides that a widow may remain in the chief house of her husband
forty days after his death, whether her dower is assigned to her within that period or
not, that she shall not be liable to pay any rent for the same, and that in the meantime
she is to have “reasonable sustenance” out of the estate of her husband.97
89 1787 N.Y. Laws 51.
90 Id. at 51–52. The first section closely follows Magna Carta Chapter 7; the second section,
while it quotes the Statute of Merton Chapter 1 verbatim, does not refer to that statute by name.
91 Id. at 51.
92 Jackson ex dem. Clark v. O’Donaghy, 7 Johns. 247 (1810).
93 7 Johns. 247 (1810).
94 Id. at 248.
95 Id.
96 1929 N.Y. Laws 518. Later statutes repeat the language. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 204
(McKinney 2015). In 1940, in In re Kelly’s Estate, the surrogate for King’s County not only
quoted Jackson with approval but referred to Magna Carta, Glanville, Coke, and Blackstone.
20 N.Y.S. 2d 684, 686–87 (1940). The issue was actually the nature of quarantine, not its length;
the surrogate found that it was “in reality, substantially a preface to dower and . . . only a
widow who is entitled to the latter may be awarded the former.” Id. at 688. New York also
adopted a number of English limitations on dower; it was barred for misconduct of a wife
resulting in divorce and it required a widow to choose between dower and jointure. N.Y.
REAL PROP. LAW §§ 196-A, 197 (McKinney 2014).
97 1787 N.Y. Laws 51.
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Other states were more liberal to the widow as Magna Carta interpretation
veered from the earlier English texts, even as the Charter’s language was quoted or
paraphrased in statutes and opinions. Virginia provided that a woman could occupy
and continue in her husband’s mansion house and she could have a viscontiel writ
“in the nature of de quarentina habenda,” with proceedings and speed as had or
might have been used on that writ.98 In Pennsylvania, the judges of its Supreme
Court were instructed to report to the legislature which British statutes ought to be
accepted. They duly declared the statute of 9 Henry III Chapter 7—Magna Carta
1225—to be in force, but only its provision of the new right of quarantine.99 There
was, after all, no king or lord to be prevented from making a widow pay for her
dower or inheritance or marriage portion. There were provisions for quarantine of
one kind or another in a number of states, among them Alabama, Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. Nor was this
idle fidelity to an abstract notion; widows made vigorous use of the protection
offered, leaving a record of often successful litigation. Here I have elected to follow
quarantine in one state, New Jersey, whose statutes and court decisions regarding
it span more than 200 years with records both complete and accessible.
Quarantine in New Jersey had its origin in common law. The state’s first con-
stitution was adopted before it was a state, on July 5, 1776, and it provides “[t]hat
the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been
heretofore practiced in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be
98 A statute protecting quarantine was passed by the Virginia General Assembly in October
1705: An Act for the distribution of intestate estates declaring widows rights to their deceased
husband’s estate and for securing orphans estates. 3 HENING STAT. AT LARGE 371, 374. The
revised code of 1819 recites An Act to reduce into one all Acts and Parts of Acts relating to
Dower, passed December 6, 1792:
[Until] such dower . . . be assigned, it shall be lawful for her to re-
main and continue in the mansion house, and the messuage or plantation
thereto belonging, without being chargeable to pay the heir any rent for
the same . . . .
And, if she be thereof in the [meantime] deforced, she shall have
a [viscontiel] writ, in the nature of a writ de quarantina habenda directed
to the sheriff; whereupon such proceedings and speed shall be used as
hath or might have been used on the said writ of quarantine.
1 REV. CODE 1819, c.107. In 1990, Virginia abolished dower and curtesy but protected the
interests of a surviving spouse whose dower or curtesy vested prior to January 1, 1991. The
rights of such parties were to be governed by the laws in force before that date: 1990 Va. Acts
1367 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-301 (2012)).
99 SAMUEL ROBERTS, A DIGEST OF SELECT BRITISH STATUTES 176 (1817). The chapter
is quoted in its entirety with a footnote “‘That part only of this statute is in force which pro-
vides, that a widow shall tarry in the chief house of her husband forty days after her husband’s
death, within which days her dower shall be assigned to her.’ Report of the Judges.” Id.
Common law dower and curtesy have been abolished in Pennsylvania.
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altered by a future law of the Legislature . . . .”100 In 1797, the New Jersey Supreme
Court decided Den v. Dodd,101 upholding quarantine in an action of ejectment.
Magna Carta Chapter 7 is referred to as “the law” and the decision cites an English
case of 1773, Goodtitle v. Newman102 as authority.103 It was a shaky precedent, resting
on Justice Gould’s dictum suggesting that a woman could remain beyond forty days
until her dower was assigned, and it was criticized strongly by Chancellor Kent as
opposed to all English and American authorities—and was later retracted.104 But in
1799, quarantine got a homegrown statutory basis and the rule in Den was substan-
tially adopted. An Act relating to Dower of that year reads: “And be it enacted, [t]hat
until such dower be [assigned] to her, it [s]hall be lawful for the widow to remain in,
and to hold and enjoy the man[s]ion hou[s]e of her hu[s]band, and the me[ss]uage or
plantation thereto belonging, without being liable to pay any rent for the [s]ame.”105
New Jersey revised its statutes over the course of the nineteenth century, but those
relating to quarantine remained relatively unchanged and Magna Carta still remained
its bedrock. In 1871, the Vice-Chancellor could remark in an opinion that the statute
in effect at the time “is but an amplification of [the] provision of Magna Charta,
beneficially extending the term of the widow, and expressly declaring that she shall
hold the premises free of rent.”106 Many of the ground rules formulated in English
moots and commentaries—perhaps with roots in unreported litigation—still held,
beginning with the most essential: where there was no dower there could be no quar-
antine.107 The premises subject to quarantine had to have been the mansion house or
chief messuage of the husband, possessed or occupied by him at the time of his
death.108 That was the issue in 1897, when Grace Davis, whose dower had not yet
been assigned, claimed quarantine in an entire building whose upper floors she occu-
pied but whose lower floors were used as a hardware store and were rented by her
husband to a firm in which he was a partner.109 Were the mercantile premises part
of the mansion house of her husband? Were they part of the messuage thereto
belonging? For the answer, the Vice Chancellor started with Magna Carta and went
100 N.J. CONST. (1776) c. 22, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/nj15.asp [http://
perma.cc/53UB-AEDT].
101 1 Hal. 367 (N.J. 1797).
102 3 Wils. 176 (1733).
103 Den held that a widow in possession of land could not be ousted by the owner of the
fee unless her dower was assigned her. Den, 1 Hal. 367.
104 4 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *62 (William Kent ed., New York
1857). See the argument for the appellant in Spinning v. Spinning, 43 N.J. Eq. 215, 216–234
(1887).
105 An Act relative to Dower, c. 753, § 2, Acts of the Twenty-Third General Assembly of
the State of New-Jersey, Trenton (1799).
106 McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 22 N.J. Eq. 505, 510 (1871).
107 Morgan v. Titus, 3 N.J. Eq. 201, 204 (N.J. Ch. 1835).
108 See Davis v. Lowden, 38 A. 648, 650 (N.J. Ch. 1897).
109 Id. at 649.
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on to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, offering a detailed discourse on the meaning of
“messuage.”110 Was the widow actually in possession of those premises, so that she
could be said to remain in them? “The words ‘remain in’ found in our statute, are taken
from Magna Charta, c. 7,—‘[e]t maneat in capitali messuagio mariti sui’—and are
therefore to be accorded the same meaning as has been given to the same words in
that instrument.”111 To find out what that meaning was, he turned to Coke, various
abridgements, and Fitzherbert’s New Natura Brevium.112 And, unsurprisingly, since
none of those authorities contemplated a hardware store lease, he found that the
husband had not occupied the lower floors and therefore the widow could not be
said to remain in them.113
But also, many of the long-standing rules were subject to interpretation, and
where the earlier English courts had limited the widow’s right, the New Jersey courts
tended to expand it. Several requirements underwent a transformation. Quarantine
was lost by the widow’s voluntary departure from the premises, but one could physi-
cally leave without legally departing: a widow did not have to personally occupy the
mansion house.114 She could rent out part or all of it and collect the rent from her
tenant until her dower was assigned.115 In Craige v. Morris,116 the widow, whose
dower had not yet been assigned, periodically rented out the mansion house; the heir
claimed the rent on the grounds that quarantine had been forfeited by her failing to
personally occupy the premises.117 The court ruled that she was occupying them, by
her tenant.118 Again, in 1895 it was held that a widow entitled to quarantine could
rent part of the mansion house, while living in the rest, and keep the rent.119 A 1906
decision went even further.120 Edward Augustus rented out part of his dwelling as
a store and used the upper story of a small building unconnected to it for his busi-
ness, renting out the lower story.121 Mrs. Augustus, his widow, continued to use the
property in that way until her death.122 It was held that as her dower had not been
assigned, there should be no accounting for the rent received during the period of
her widowhood; quarantine gave her the right to either rent or occupy personally.123
110 Id. at 650–51 (citations omitted).
111 Id. at 651.
112 Id. (citations omitted).
113 Id. at 652–53. The full name of the case, Grace E. Davis v. John J. Lowden, as guardian
of Lester Roscoe Davis, gives a picture of the circumstances surrounding the dispute.
114 See Craige v. Morris, 25 N.J. Eq. 467 (N.J. Ch. 1875).
115 Id. at 469.
116 25 N.J. Eq. 467 (N.J. Ch. 1875).
117 Id. at 467–68.
118 Id. at 468–69.
119 Flynn v. O’Malley, 33 A. 402, 403 (N.J. Ch. 1895).
120 Lloyd v. Turner, 62 A. 771, 772 (N.J. Ch. 1906).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 771–72.
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The issue of the husband’s own occupation of the premises, which might have seemed
relevant in light of Davis v. Lowden, was not addressed.124
Another alteration was the allowing of assignment of quarantine. Several cases
recognized the principle that dower was assignable in equity,125 while two others
declared inter alia that quarantine was an incident of dower and inseparable from
it;126 therefore it followed that dower being assignable, quarantine must go with it.
The result benefited the assignee in Moffett v. Trent.127 The plaintiff, Catharine
Moffett, held a mortgage on premises occupied by a widow under her right of quar-
antine, dower having not been assigned.128 She was also the grantee of the widow’s
dower rights.129 The issue was whether she was required, before foreclosing on the
mortgage, to account for rents received.130 The court held that she was not; the widow
holding in quarantine would not have had to account and the quarantine was trans-
ferred with the dower right.131 There was no discussion of whether quarantine could
be transferred without the widow’s transfer of dower.132 Finally, in a nod to nineteenth-
century realities, in Spinning v. Spinning,133 it was held that a woman was not obliged
to pay taxes or mortgage interest or to make repairs on property she held as her
quarantine—all issues probably not contemplated by either Magna Carta or Coke.134
Spinning is notable not only for its holding but for the learned journey it provides
through the history of quarantine. A lower court held in favor of the widow and one or
more of the children appealed.135 The appellant’s brief takes up eighteen pages and
ranges widely attempting to prove that New Jersey quarantine is not common law
quarantine; it is a life estate in land and the tenant of a life estate must keep down
annual charges.136 And even if it is not an estate in land, there is always the Latin
maxim—which is not translated—that one who enjoys the benefits ought to bear the
burdens. There are citations to Magna Carta Chapter 7, Coke upon Littleton, Bacon’s
Abridgement, Viner’s Abridgement, Kent’s Commentaries, and miscellaneous English
124 See id.
125 In Smallwood v. Bilderback, 16 N.J.L. 497, 506 (1838) the validity of the sale was as-
sumed, with the result that the widow had no right of entry into the premises thereafter. Other
states came to similar conclusions about alienability. See Payne v. Becker, 87 N.Y. 153 (1881)
and the lengthy discussion by the Cuyahoga [Ohio] Common Pleas Court in Stolz v. Boltz,
8 Ohio Dec. Reprint 61 (1880).
126 See Spinning v. Spinning, 43 N.J. Eq. 215 (1887); Bleecker v. Hennion, 23 N.J. Eq. 123
(N.J. Ch. 1872).
127 56 A. 1035, 1036 (N.J. Ch. 1904).
128 Id. at 1035–36.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 1036–37.
132 See id.
133 43 N.J. Eq. 215 (1887).
134 Id. at 246–48.
135 Id. at 217.
136 Id. at 216–34.
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and American cases.137 But then the argument gets far less theoretical: “[o]ught the
heir pay for the use his stepmother, perhaps, makes of the gas, fire and police protec-
tion, school facilities & [ ] furnished by the public authorities? . . . Or, if [the widow]
pay same and then receive credit . . . the estate of the heir is . . . impaired.”138 And
the argument concludes with a flourish: “It is no hardship on widows. They can quit
the homestead at any time, and at any time apply for assignment of dower.”139
The attorney for Mrs. Spinning needed only seven pages and used less learning,
but he also invoked Magna Carta, Coke, and the Natura Brevium, together with an
assortment of cases from various jurisdictions.140 The burden of his argument was
that quarantine was a privilege, simply a right incident to dower unassigned, not a
tenancy, let alone a life estate.141 In support of the position, he cited Ketillesby v.
Kettillesby for the proposition that in claiming quarantine a widow must show the
date of death of her husband and the forty days thereafter, although his point is not
entirely clear.142 Not to be outdone in learning, in his opinion Justice Scudder began
by noting the historic derivation of New Jersey’s law in order to determine the widow’s
interest, citing English authorities.143 He rejected the Latin maxim, accepted that
quarantine was a privilege, and concluded that it was misleading to construe statu-
tory rights by terms of law conformed to rules of the common law—although he
cited with approval the comment in McLaughlin v. McLaughlin that the statute was
“but an amplification of the provision of [Magna Carta].”144 Then finally he, too,
descended to the practical: if the home was all that was left to the widow, the burden
of paying taxes and making repairs might be a loss rather than a benefit to her, which
was not the purpose of the Act.145
All this was in the nineteenth century, so much of whose practice was swept
away in the twentieth by revised statutes and codes. One major change in New Jersey
came about in 1929, when a provision in the Revised Statutes extended quarantine
137 Id. (citations omitted).
138 Id. at 233.
139 Id. at 234.
140 Id. at 234–43 (citations omitted).
141 Id. at 236.
142 Id. at 238 (citing Kettillesby v. Kettillesby, supra note 47, at 76).
143 Id. at 243–48 (citations omitted).
144 Id. at 246 (quoting McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 22 N.J. Eq. 505, 510 (1871).
145 Id. 246–47. The widow was, however, liable to pay water charges as they were personal
expenses rather than a lien and charge on the estate. Id. at 248. In In re Flasch, 143 A.2d 208
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958), the estate of a widower who died without claiming his right
of curtesy was denied reimbursement for payments of mortgage principal and interest, taxes,
and insurance premiums on premises that descended from his first wife to his minor children
and in which he lived with them. Flasch, 143 A.2d at 208–14. It was argued that, not having
been allotted curtesy, he held in quarantine under the 1929 statute. See id. at 220. The court
denied the claim; it was a breach of his fiduciary duty to the children not to apply for assign-
ment of curtesy, as that would have made him a life tenant as such liable for the payments.
Id. at 223–24. It further assumed the payments were gifts to the children. Id.
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to widowers; a widower was entitled to quarantine until his curtesy was assigned,
on the same terms that a widow was until assignment of dower.146 In 1941, the rule
stated in Craige v. Morris and Lloyd v. Turner that there was a right to rent out the
homestead was cited, this time in favor of a widower.147 Little else appeared altered.
Woolf v. Woolf 148 was decided in 1950. Carroll Woolf had lived in a house in Matawan
until his second marriage; thereafter, though occasionally staying in the house, he
moved into his new wife’s apartment until his death nine months later.149 At that time,
his sons moved into the Matawan house, but did not assign dower to the widow.150
She claimed quarantine and a lower court allowed the rental value of the premises
from the date of her husband’s death until admeasurement of her dower, in satisfac-
tion of her right of quarantine.151 The Superior Court Appellate Division upheld the
decision, holding that the house continued to be decedent’s mansion house and that
case law confirmed that a widow did not have to personally occupy it.152 There is
reference to Magna Carta, Coke, and the Statute of 1799, substantially unchanged
by subsequent revisions.153 Noting that at common law the widow had her writ de
quarantina habenda against an heir who put her out without assigning dower, the
court ruled that “[t]he continuation of the widow’s right of quarantine [was] the pen-
alty the statute impose[d] on the heirs who do not assign her dower.”154 Nor was the
case unique; in 1953, in Bruten v. Miller,155 one of the plaintiff’s claims was to dower.
There is no mention in the opinion of a claim to quarantine, but the court introduced
it, quoting the applicable statute.156 It went on to cite Woolf for the proposition that
personal occupation of a mansion house was not essential to the right and then dis-
cussed liability for taxes, encumbrances, repairs, and insurance, citing cases ranging
from 1887 to 1948 which held that all were the heirs’ responsibility.157 The plaintiff
was awarded reimbursement for payments she had made which should have been
made by the heirs, but not, however, for sums paid for improvements to the property.158
146 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:35-4 (West 1929). “Until dower or curtesy is assigned, the widow
or widower may remain in, hold and enjoy the mansion house of his or her spouse and the
messuage and plantation belonging thereto, without being liable to pay rent therefor.” Id.
147 Alt v. Kwiatek, 17 A.2d 161, 164 (N.J. Ch. 1941). The court was unsure whether “man-
sion house” meant the entire building owned by the late Mrs. Alt or only the apartment within
it that she lived in—a circumstance surely not contemplated in 1225. Id. The court cited the hold-
ings in Davis v. Lowden and Lloyd v. Turner in support of its uncertainty. Id. (citations omitted).
148 77 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950).
149 Id. at 476.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 477 (citations omitted).
153 Id. at 476 (citations omitted).
154 Id. at 477.
155 101 A.2d 24 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1953).
156 Id. at 26 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:35-4 (West 1929)).
157 Id. (citing Woolf v. Woolf, 77 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950)).
158 Id. (citing Spinning v. Spinning, 43 N.J. Eq. 215 (1887); Bahr v. Cooper, 58 A.2d 604
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In 1980, New Jersey by statute abolished dower for any marriage occurring after
May 28th of that year.159 However, the right of quarantine remained protected,
presumably referring to situations where dower or curtesy could still be claimed. In
1984, Janet Del Guercio, who had been married in 1969, left her husband and insti-
tuted a suit for divorce; he died before he was served with process and she sued for
dower and quarantine.160 In In Re Del Guercio Estate,161 the court held that she was
indeed entitled to dower, which was to be admeasured.162 But, it went on, “it is clear
that from the time of Magna Carta an essential element of quarantine was that the
widow should not be deprived” of the house in which she had lived at her husband’s
death.163 Janet Del Guercio had not occupied the house at that time and she was not
entitled to quarantine.164 Presumably the court felt that this was one voluntary
departure which could not fit into any expanded definition of “occupy.”165
In the first years of the twenty-first century, the New Jersey legislature repealed
many sections of the law which dealt with married women, on the ground that they
were no longer needed and were demeaning.166 It also revised Title 3-A dealing with
Administration of Estates. But New Jersey Revised Statutes section 3A:35-4 (2015),
saved from repeal more than once, continues to be in effect.167 It reads:
Until dower or curtesy is assigned, the widow or widower
may remain in, hold and enjoy the mansion house of his or her
spouse and the messuage and plantation belonging thereto, with-
out being liable to pay rent therefor.
After assignment of dower or curtesy, the rights confirmed in
and granted to the widow or widower by this section shall cease.168
It is a statutory right, but its language is familiar. At least for the moment, a
descendant of Magna Carta Chapter 7 is alive and well and living in New Jersey.
(N.J. Ch. 1948); Alt v. Kwiatek, 17 A.2d 161 (N.J. Ch. 1941); Tarrant v. Carrig, 133 A. 552
(N.J. Ch. 1926); Lloyd v. Turner, 62 A. 771 (N.J. Ch. 1906)).
159 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:28-2 (West 1980).
160 In re Del Guercio Estate, 501 A.2d 1072, 1073 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
161 501 A.2d 1072 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
162 Id. at 1074.
163 Id. (citing Davis v. Lowden, 38 A. 648, 651 (N.J. Ch. 1897)).
164 Id.
165 See id.
166 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2-8, 15 (repealed 2011).
167 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3A:35-4 (West 2015).
168 Id.
